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In spite of the increasing number of certification schemes in the food sector, there is only few 
research about the economics of certification. Given the rapid growth and the lack of experience the 
actors have to cope with different forms of opportunistic behaviour. The following paper describes the 
basic structure and information economics reasons why certification schemes are created. 
Subsequently, an institutionalistic model is presented which includes several starting points to increase 
quality of certification systems mainly based on analogies in financial auditing.  
 






Numerous crises and scandals (BSE, FMD etc.) have shaken the European food sector over the 
past years. In spite of far-reaching regulations and governmental control most of the causes could not 
be detected until the crises had occurred leading to a loss of consumer confidence in the safety and 
quality of many food products. To regain consumers’ trust different players have founded an 
increasing number of quality assurance schemes. In the long run only a reliable control procedure 
reduces the risk of food scandals. Whereas research and public debate on the audit quality within the 
food sector are just at the beginning, there is a great deal of discussion about auditing in general. 
Scandals like Enron caused a deep loss of confidence in the quality of audits (Baker, 2002, Shaikh and 
Talha, 2003).  
Principally, auditing and certification processes bear similarities in incentive structures and 
institutional organisation. Auditors or certifiers monitor the managers’ activities in order to reduce 
problems of moral hazard in (production) processes (Ballwieser, 1987). Usually, the auditing process 
is carried out by independent inspectors (certifiers) who in turn are granted admission according to the 
rules of the certifying body. Only if the certifiers succeed in revealing flaws and opportunistic 
behaviour within the production chain quality assurance concepts are likely to build up reputation and 
serve as a quality signal. From practical experience we know that especially certification systems are 
susceptible to opportunistic behaviour of the actors. An example is the nitrofen scandal: Storing 
organic corn in a pesticide-contaminated warehouse lead to heavy contamination, which was not 
revealed by the certifying institution (Spiller, 2003). Obviously, the quality of the institutional 
structure considerably adds to the effectiveness of a certifying system. Based on New Institutional 
Economics, the following paper analyses the core structure of certification systems and options to 
increase the quality of the respective control procedures. In the end, a brief case study about organic 
certification underlines issues of our presented model.   
2. Certification  Systems 
2.1  General Structure of Certification Systems 
“Certification is the (voluntary) assessment and approval by an (accredited) party on an 
(accredited) standard” (Meuwissen et al., 2003). The main feature of a certification system is that 
inspections are carried out by independent bodies (third party audit) and based on regulations laid 
down by external organisations (Luning et al., 2002). On the one hand, the introduction of certification 
systems as a sector-specific standard element does increase the costs related to spot market activities. 
On the other hand, quality insecurity for traders and consumers can be reduced significantly. In 
practice, there is a high variety of certification systems.  
Basically, all those systems have a similar structure as shown in figure 1. Central point is the flow 
of goods between producers and customers. The supplier provides a certificate serving as a quality 
signal, which is issued by a neutral certifier based on certification standards laid down by the 
responsible agency. The certifier, in turn, has to prove the ability to carry out inspections according to 
defined standards. In the majority of the systems this is done by an accrediting body on the basis of the 
ISO 65/EN 45011 standards. Accreditation is a largely formal act and does not include supervision of 
the real working process. This is why some of the certification systems intend to introduce a 
monitoring function involving control-of-the-control institutions either by the system agency itself or 


















Figure 1. Basic structure of a certification system 
2.2  Why Certification? – Quality Uncertainty and the Functioning of Markets 
According to the economic model, markets are characterised by supply and demand with the aim 
exchanging goods. Many theoretical economic approaches imply that both suppliers and buyers are 
fully informed about the commodities concerned. In fact, market activities are often characterised by 
far-reaching information deficits and quality uncertainties the consumer has to pay for (Akerlof, 1970, 
Spence, 1976). They do not only impede a smooth market functioning but −especially in the food 
market− also require a focus on consumer protection to ensure food safety (Caswell and Mojduszka, 
1996, Antle, 2001).  
In the following, another quality characteristic is added to the search, experience, and credence 
attributes that are traditionally dealt with in information economics (Nelson, 1970, Darby and Karni, 
1973): Goods featuring the so-called Potemkin attributes (Bodenstein, Spiller 1998) are characterised 
by the fact that neither the buyer nor external institutions are able to carry out controls because these process attributes (e. g. Organic Farming, geographical origin or the animal welfare) cannot even be 
detected in a laboratory analysis (Vetter and Karantininis, 2002). In the case of credence attributes, in 
contrast, product contamination can be revealed by means of inspections carried out by external 
consumer protection organisations, public authorities or competitors. By investing large amounts in 
advertising and thus binding themselves, in the case of credence attributes vendors are able to issue a 
reliable quality signal reducing information asymmetry. Consumers, in turn, will trust in the signal 
given the realistic danger of quality flaw detection leading to a capital spending depreciation (sunk 
costs) on the part of the vendor. The information asymmetry related to Potemkin attributes, however, 
cannot be bypassed and potentially involves adverse selection processes as quality statements can be 
made with a minimum of risk. What is needed to circumvent these basic problems is an investigation 
scheme that covers the whole supply chain and ensures inspections throughout the production process.  
Given the aforementioned reasons individual supplier cannot enter into a binding commitment in 
the case of Potemkin attributes such as environmental protection and animal welfare. Hence, 
especially in the food market certifying concepts gain relevance as they consider the whole value 
chain and ensure audits throughout the whole production process (Auriol and Schilizzi, 2002). By 
means of regular control and –where necessary- additional sampling inspection institutions watch the 
whole supply chain. Once having been awarded the certificate, the companies are entitled to make use 
of the quality label for consumer marketing purposes supposed to issue truly reliable quality signals. 
New legal standards such as the EC regulation No. 178/2002 on traceability will surely fuel the 
discussion on those forms of quality assurance which comprise all production stages (Theuvsen, 
2003).  
31  Factors Influencing Inspection Quality 
The following discussion of certification quality relies on models of auditing theory as there are 
many parallels in the basic battery of audits. Auditing is in the interest of shareholders as well as the 
capital market if, in combination with published financial statements, it imparts a credible indication 
of management quality. However, it cannot be taken for granted that the auditor − or the certifier − 
will act benevolently (Makkawi and Schick, 2003). Indeed, the audit will be conducted as a business 
and, therefore, rationally if the auditor can reduce the cost of the audit. Moreover, the auditor’s 
mandate comes from the management of the company being audited, which would prefer no discovery 
of existing faults (Marten, 1999, Loitlsberger, 2002). In certification systems in the area of quality 
assurance, the addressees are commercial customers and consumers. In such situations, the certifier 
functions as their agent, the relationship being comparable to that between an investor and an 
accountant.  
3.1 Overview 
The following discussion focuses on the efforts related to the quality of the signal issued by the 
system agency (body responsible for the system structure) to produce an incentive-compatible 
inspection standard. We start from the assumption that the system agency is interested in the highest 
possible inspection standard. In practice, of course, this may not always hold true because there are 
sometimes additional aims (e.g. agricultural interests may dominate consumer intentions) depending 
on the economic interests of the system agency. However, we will leave such motives out of the initial 
discussion.  
The model is premised on rational and risk-neutral agents tending to act opportunistically. 
Assuming the existence of a perfect audit technology, with heightened inspection intensity, the 
probability of discovering shortcomings grows, as investigation costs do. Certification fees are fixed 
exogenously. Under these premises, the certification body acts to minimise costs. 
The certifier’s optimisation calculus can be represented as follows (Müller, 2004): The certifier’s 
marginal costs (MCC) arise from the marginal costs of the inspection (MCI) together with the marginal 
opportunity costs of the loss of the client (MCO). The latter two pertain to the danger that a company 
will replace a certifier they view as too strict with a more lenient one. Against a unilateral 
minimisation of these costs stand the costs of a deficient inspection being discovered (MCB), which in 
turn is composed of the potential loss of reputation resulting from the inadequate inspections becoming generally known (MCR) and the potential liability (MCL). Thus, the relevant cost functions 
to be minimised are as follows: 
 
 
MCC = MCI + MCO  (1) 
MCB = MCR + MCL   (2) 
 
 
From the certifier’s point of view, a cost minimum appears at the intersection of the two curves 
that determines the inspection quality to be estimated by the auditor (see fig. 1). From these 
considerations, we can derive four basic starting points for improving inspection quality: (1) extending 
the certifier’s liability (increasing the marginal costs of potential liability), (2) intensifying the effects 
on reputation in the certification market (increasing the marginal costs of loss of reputation), (3) 
decreasing the certifier’s dependence on the firm being inspected (reducing the opportunity costs of 
losing the client) and (4) reducing the audit costs by improving certification technology (reducing the 










































Figure 2: Determination of the cost minimum inspection standard (Müller 2004) 
 
3.2 Intensifying  Liability 
Intensifying the inspector’s liability raises the marginal costs of the liability and, thus, induces the 
certifier to increase the quality of the inspection. The certifier’s liability for negligent inspection (PN) 
is the product of the probability of discovery (PD), the probability of liability (PL) and the potential fine 
(PF) (Becker, 1968): 
 
 
PN = PD x PL x PF   (3) 
 
 
At present, in most certification concepts, the probability of discovery is relatively small, and 
there is only a slight threat of liability in practice. System agency today generally relies on the 
inspector’s formal accreditation. In important systems such as EUREPGAP or IFS, for example, there are no plans to establish a supervisory authority. This is clearly contrary to financial auditing. Here, 
two meta-control concepts can be distinguished: monitoring (in Great Britain and Spain, among 
others) and peer review (as in France and the United States). With monitoring, quality control is 
carried out by a professional organisation or public agency while, in the case of peer review, 
colleagues in the profession are called in audit committees. Without such meta-controls, the threat of 
discovery only exists in cases where damage to a customer becomes common knowledge in the 
industry. 
The certifier’s probability of liability is relativised by the effective claims of negligence and the 
apportionment of the burden of proof. In auditing, there is no absolute liability, so in each case the 
certifier’s guilt must be proven by the injured party. For outsiders, this is naturally difficult. For this 
reason, there is intense debate about the preventive effects of absolute liability (Ewert, 1999). 
In Germany, as in many other European nations, the certifier’s potential fine is not determined by 
third party damages, that is, the losses suffered by those who relied on the signal sent by the 
certification (customers and consumers); only the contracting party can enforce damage payments. 
Shared liability on the part of quality certifiers for the enormous damages that result from a well-
known brand’s loss of reputation can significantly contribute to increasing the level of care they would 
exercise. 
In the literature, incentives represented by intensified liability are sometimes contested with 
reference to insurability (Ewert et al., 2000). Accordingly, stringent liability would only lead to higher 
insurance premiums and, thus, to higher inspection costs. This argument applies only if insurers have 
no opportunity to observe the certifier’s activities, that is to say, to monitor liability risk. In high risk 
cases, this might mean that no insurance policies would be provided. Should this happen, the attendant 
risk would be intolerable for certifiers, especially if they were made liable not only in cases of 
opportunistic behaviour but also in those of coincidental or (for the inspector) unrecognisable errors 
(inherent inspection risk). Differentiating between these error categories is essential to the 
practicability of an increased level of liability; otherwise, the certification market might well collapse. 
 
3.3  Intensifying Effects on Reputation 
An intensification of the effects on reputation would have a similar effect to that of the threat of 
liability discussed above. If there are no effects on reputation, the supplier has a clear interest in 
superficial certification. The resulting adverse selection will be encountered only if marketing effects 
are triggered by certification through a certifier known to be thorough.  
The disclosure of erroneous certifications by the system agency would be a conceivable and very 
efficient variation. Nonetheless, this would require the existence of a third level of control. The failed 
company and the “successful” inspector would have to be named.  
The size of the certification body and the consequent strengthening of the effects on reputation 
resulting from the high sunk costs is an option much debated in the literature on auditing. According to 
the findings of empirical studies in auditing, international renowned CPA groups can command high 
audit fees (Comunale and Sexton, 2003). This can be seen as a reputation bonus which would be lost 
should there be a scandal. Therefore, in case of doubt, the shareholder should call upon the company 
to contract with a highly reputed CPA firm or certifier. 
 
3.4 Protecting  Quasi-Rents 
Protecting quasi-rents, which can be traced back to low-balling as described above, means in 
essence that the certifier’s dependence is diminished. Currently, in most certification systems, 
suppliers are free to choose their inspectors and, moreover, to change them at any time, even while the 
contract is still running. Such changes are not even publicised. Under these conditions, it is easy for a 
producer to go “opinion shopping”.  
A starting point for increasing the certifier’s neutrality could be the introduction of a 25% rule, 
according to which certifiers would not be permitted to accept clients who would collect higher shares 
of their overall turnover. This would reduce dependency structures, but would, admittedly, also 
contribute to a concentration process on the certification market. Moreover, it is important to forbid changing inspectors in mid-contract. Such changes are still permitted in some fields, such as organic 
certification.  
Separating consulting from certification would contribute to a further mitigation of the distinct 
dependent relationship that develops if certifiers are also allowed to function as consultants. If the 
auditing market functions as an entry to the lucrative consultancy market, the opportunity costs of 
losing a client increase significantly. For this reason it is necessary to eliminate consultancy by 
certifiers (Tirole, 1995). 
Suggestions that the customer chooses the certifier are particularly far-reaching, as is the case, for 
example, in the German certification system for egg producer KAT e. V., whereby exclusive certifiers 
are chosen for specific regions by the system agency. In this case, there ceases to be any harmony of 
goal between the principal and the agent, and, thus, there is no dependency any more. A disadvantage 
is the limitation on competition, which can lead to higher inspection prices and threaten the neutrality 
of the certifier, e.g. acting as an agent of the retailing business. 
Forced rotation of inspectors is another way to minimize the low-balling effect. However, this 
solution has the disadvantage of raising the inspection costs as the accumulation of experience 
resulting from repeated certification of the customer is lost. For this reason, it might be pondered 
whether inspection contracts could not always, as a matter of principle, last several years and include a 
pre-arranged termination date. In this way, the certifier’s quasi-rent would be protected and, at the 
same time, learning effects achieved (Müller, 2004). 
 
3.5  Improvement of Inspection Technology 
In the preceding section, we assumed perfect inspection technology. In practice, certifiers can 
have varying levels of success with the same costs due to having different levels of know-how or 
different software support. Improved inspection technology lowers certification costs and, at the same 
time, contributes to enhanced certification quality. In addition to training and better technical support, 
appropriate instruments include risk-oriented inspection approaches or a better exchange of data and 
information between the regulatory bodies.  
 
2  Case study: Organic Certification 
Principally, only few studies deal with the empirical foundation of models concerning the quality 
of inspection in financial auditing and there are hardly any empirical analyses in the field of 
certification quality. Therefore, the following case study about the organic certification scheme is a 
first step to underline the described model. In 1992 the European Union launched a certification 
system for OrganicFood (Regulation EEC N° 2092/91) based on the guidelines of organic agriculture 
organisations (Michelsen et al., 1999). The great lack of credibility in consumer perception has been 
one of the most important barriers for the diffusion of organic farming. In a first research step we 
developed hypothesis by expert interviews in Germany and Great Britain. The experts mentioned the 
following “critical points”:   
-  Contrary to other certification approaches, organic certification implies monitoring activities by the 
state. However, each public agency has its own standards to control certification bodies. Thus, the 
standardisation of monitoring processes is low and as a consequence, differences in performance 
might appear. In particular monitoring overseas inspections is difficult and opportunistic behaviour 
may easily occur (“coffee-house-controls”).  
-  Secondly, many certification bodies work together with organic associations. Basically, there has to 
be a separation between advisory services and certification bodies, but there still might be a conflict 
of interests. As a result the inspection report could be affected. 
-  Another crucial element is the high degree of fluctuation of certifiers in some certification bodies. 
Closely linked to this trend is the corresponding training of the inspectors. In contrast to financial 
auditing, the training is short and rather un-specific. The investment in human capital is on a low 
level, thus, scarcely any sunk costs appear. Additionally, the salaries of the certifiers are usually kept 
down. As a consequence some certification bodies try to develop their own professional standards 
including special trainings and financial incentives. By this means, sunk costs and incentives rise.  -  Reputation effects are mainly responsible for the success of certification body increasing their 
certification quality. Experts mentioned that currently only few customers and/or suppliers consider 
reputation of certification processes. In order to reduce (economic) pressure on certification bodies 
more reputation effects are necessary to raise quality orientation in organic certification processes.  
-  A similar effect is associated with the oversupply of certification services on the certification 
market. Whereas in Germany the current number of certification bodies is constant (22), in the U.K. 
there is an increasing number of certifying organisations (approx. 15). Price-competition is 
consequently high and there is a loss of diligence reducing inspection costs. 
-  A last point is the problem of control gaps between stages of the organic supply chain. As a result it 
may occur that larger quantities of organic products are sold than produced (e. g. Frühschütz 2002). 
This is a result of insufficient data management. Hence, better data-interfaces have to be created.  
 
Altogether, the mentioned issues are just some critical points among others. Players involved 
already try to increase the quality level of organic certification processes, particularly, on the 
efficiency of the state run meta-control and transparency (common database). Further research 
processes and surveys have to follow first explorative studies on the status quo of certification quality. 
 
3 Conclusions 
In the food industry, process qualities such as animal and environmental protection, food safety or 
sustainability are playing an increasing role. Information asymmetry can only be avoided through 
certification systems that encompass the entire value chain. The theoretical model shows the inherent 
risks in monitoring procedures from an economic perspective. In light of our described case study and 
other practitioner reports on dumping prices in the certification market and considerable differences in 
performance, trust in certification labels is a crucial capital. Individual crises in the past indicate that 
the certification market is unstable and susceptible to interference.  
It is urgent that the meta-control level of the certification concept is strengthened since it provides 
a potential for improving inspection quality, which can be easily mobilised. In the existing 
certification approaches based on the ISO 65 or EN 45011 standards accreditation is formalised and 
sector-unspecific. It does not meet expectations. In state-run certification systems in which the actual 
control tasks are generally delegated to private certifiers, public authorities are responsible for meta-
control. This would have to be considerably expanded. In the sense of a public-private partnership, 
private certification concepts could integrate public monitoring. An alternative is the expanding of 
peer-review systems. 
At the same time, this discussion has also shown that stricter controls can just as easily have 
undesirable side-effects. For example, a limitation of competition in audit markets could be the result 
of the 25 per cent rule. Such trade-offs complicate detailed solutions. Steps to optimise certification 
schemes or auditing approaches should be taken carefully. In addition to this, there are the effects of 
interaction among the actors, such as the fact that, in the face of improved internal quality assurance, 
lowering inspection standards can be a rational response on the part of the certifier. Thus, overall 
quality will not necessarily rise. Such interaction effects are examined in game theoretic models, 
which we do not deal with here. Another limitation of our study lies in the absence of motivational 
aspects. There could be a crowding effect between inspections, certification process and external 
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